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Practical reasoning and the act of naming reality
FABRIZIO MACAGNO*
DOUGLAS WALTON
In the tradition stemming from Aristotle through Aquinas, rational decision 
making is seen as a complex structure of distinct phases in which reasoning and 
will are interconnected. Intention, deliberation, and decision are regarded as the 
fundamental steps of the decision-making process, in which an end is chosen, the 
means are specifi ed, and a decision to act is made. Underlying this process is the 
notion of classifi cation, the way a state of affairs is regarded and evaluated. The 
assessment and classifi cation of an end or the means thereto become the reason 
of an action, to which the agent needs to assent and commit to. The Aristotelian-
Thomistic account, underscoring the essential dependence between naming, 
assessing, and choosing, can provide a new perspective for analysing the modern 
models of decision making and practical reasoning developed in argumentation 
theory, philosophy, and Artifi cial Intelligence (Bench-Capon 2003; Atkinson and 
Bench-Capon 2007; Russell and Norvig 1995; Walton 2015; Brandom 1998).1
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Aristotelian and Thomistic structure 
of the reasoning underlying decision making in order to bring to light the struc-
ture of argument from practical reasoning (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008).
1. Reasoning, decision, and action
The Aristotelian structure of decision-making, grounded on the distinction (Nico-
machean Ethics III) between ends, means, and action (Westberg 2002, 17), was 
the basis of the Thomistic account. Thomas Aquinas introduced another funda-
mental element, namely the differentiation between reason and will. On this 
view, the process of action consists of four interconnected steps (four stages), 
each having an element of reason and will (Westberg 2002, 131), which can be 
represented as follows (Fig 1).
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Figure 1: The classical structure of decision-making
Figure 1 shows how the deliberation step is part of a sequence of reasoning 
based on an intention, a decision, and fi nally the execution of a selected action. 
In this structure, a crucial role is played by the rational nature of choice, relative 
to both ends and means (Westberg 2002, 83). In the Aristotelian tradition, an 
action is moved by desire as the desirable has the nature of an end, and “every 
effi cient cause acts for the sake of an end and some good” (Aquinas, On Evil, 
Q. 1., art. 1., 53, 58; see id., Q. 3, art. 3, 152). Desire has a rational component 
(Finnis 2011, 23; Westberg 2002, 83), based on the reasons that support the 
classifi cation of what counts as good (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a15). 
The classifi cation corresponds to the rational dimension of action (it can be 
correct or incorrect, reasonable or unreasonable) to which the will needs to 
assent (On Evil. Q. 3 art. 3, 151).
The rational passage from the abstract principle (the desirable) to an action 
is guaranteed by the so-called practical syllogism. The desirable needs to be 
specifi ed, namely applied to individual states of affairs towards which action 
can be directed (Westberg 2002, 85). This reasoning is represented as follows 
(Westberg 2002, 163):
Major Do good and avoid evil
Minor This is good This is evil
Conclusion Do this Do not do this
In this defeasible syllogism (Westberg 2002, 160), a step is missing. In order 
to establish whether a specifi c object is good or bad, more specifi c principles 
expressing an agent’s desires (Westberg 2002, 160) need to be applied, such 
as “One must not harm the innocent” or “One should obey God.” This aspect 
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Major Do good and avoid evil
Major II Committing adultery is evil. 
Minor II This act is adultery
Minor This is evil
Conclusion Do not do this
According to Aquinas, the classifi cation of a state of affairs as desirable or not 
is not a cognitive operation, or rather it is not only a purely intellectual judg-
ment. When an agent classifi es a state of affairs as good, he is not describing it; 
rather, he is pursuing what is good, while his preferences direct his classifi cation 
(Westberg 2002, 162). A person’s orientation towards particular goods affects 
the way he regards a state of affairs. In this sense, a classifi cation depends on 
the values the agent accepts and the hierarchy thereof he maintains. For this 
reason, the principle “One should obey God” can direct the actions of a theist, 
but not the ones of an atheist.
2. Practical classifi cation
The aforementioned syllogism is the core of the mechanism of rational action 
in Aquinas. We can notice that there are two distinct components, namely 1) 
the passage from the classifi cation of a state of affairs as falling under a value 
or another (evaluative classifi cation) to the desirability of brining it about; 
and 2) the passage from the characteristics of a state of affairs to the evaluative 
classifi cation thereof. These reasoning steps can be represented using the tools 
provided by argumentation theory, namely argumentation schemes (Walton, 
Reed, and Macagno 2008), namely abstract patterns of argument indicating 
the semantic relation between premises and conclusion, and the defeasibility 
conditions thereof. The fi rst dimension of the operative syllogism can be repre-
sented as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, 321; see also Bench-Capon 
2003a; 2003b):
Argumentation scheme 1: Argument from values to commitments
PREMISE 1: The state of affairs x is positive/
negative as judged by agent 
A according to Value V 
(value judgment).
Having an affair with this married 
woman is negative (positive) 
as it is adultery (pleasure).
   
   
   
   
   
   
   













































































                         D
ocum





indsor -   - 137.207.133.189 - 02/01/2019 21h03. ©
 A
ssociation R
evue internationale de philosophie 
FABRIZIO MACAGNO & DOUGLAS WALTON396
PREMISE 2: The fact that x is positive/negative 
affects the interpretation and 
therefore the evaluaton of goad 
G of agent A (If x is good, it 
supports commitment to goal G).
If having an affair with this 
maried woman is negative 
(positive), I should not do it 
(I should do it)
CONCLUSION The evaluation of x acording to 
value V is a reason for retaining/
retracting commitment to goal G.
I should not carry out this act of 
adultery (act of pleasure).
This scheme can be thought of as the interpretation of the practical syllogism 
in terms of commitments. Intentions (choice) can be understood as commit-
ments to bring about a specifi c type of action (Brandom 1998; von Wright 
1972). Goal G is the specifi c action that specifi es the ultimate object of desire 
(the good). Premise 2 represents thus the major premise of the practical syllo-
gism, while Premise 1 is the specifi cation (the instantiation of the desirable 
end) corresponding to minor premise. This scheme includes also the principles 
of classifi cation that the agent accepts and agrees on, namely the values. For 
example, in the aforementioned case, premise 2 is guaranteed by the values 
“adultery is evil” and “pleasure is good.”
The second dimension of the operative syllogism – indicating the relationship 
between the values and the classifi cation of possible actions – can be analyzed 
in terms of classifi cation and reasoning from classifi cation. In the Aristotelian 
tradition, the assent of the will to an action is grounded on the concept of desir-
able (αίρετόν) or objectionable (φευκτόν), namely on how an agent evaluates 
a state of affairs or rather classifi es it as good or bad (Aristotle, Topics III, 1, 
116a 18). This pattern of reasoning proceeds from principles of “practical” clas-
sifi cation to a value judgment (Macagno & Walton 2010; Walton & Macagno 
2009), where the classifi cation principle is practical in the sense that the agent 
agrees to it. This aspect of the operational syllogism can be represented as 
a kind of classifi cation (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 319):
Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from classifi cation
PREMISE 1: If some particular thing a can be classifi ed as falling under verbal 
category C, then a has property P (in virtue of such a classifi cation).
PREMISE 2: a can be classifi ed as falling under verbal category C.
CONCLUSION a has property P.
Thi s scheme can be assessed dialectically by considering the circumstances of 
the action to be assessed. The fi rst critical dimension concerns the possibility 
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that the circumstances taken into account are only a selection of the relevant 
ones, and that the pondering of other circumstances could lead to a different 
evaluation (Bowlin 1999, 6:82). The second critical dimension concerns the 
choice of the defi nition, or rather evaluative criterion. Depending on the choice 
of what is considered as good, the evaluation can change. For example, the 
killing of a man to save the life of other people can be desirable as it is an 
instance of a good act, saving lives. However, if the man killed is innocent 
and not the agent himself, the action would be a murder, which according to 
our laws is illegal and evil.
This pattern describes the relationship between two acts of will and intellect, 
namely holding a value, namely a principle connecting a state of affairs with its 
desirability, and choosing how to see a situation. According to Aquinas, while 
holding values shapes an agent’s life (a man can be an atheist or a theist; he 
can prefer money to knowledge, etc.), choosing how to see a situation defi nes 
one’s action (Westberg 2002, 163). This practical classifi cation scheme repre-
sents the freedom of action in terms of freedom to classify something as good 
or bad. In this sense, this classifi catory process is a combination of will and 
judgment. The freedom of classifi cation does not correspond to arbitrariness 
of classifi cation. It simply means that an agent acts based on reasons, which, 
however, can be good or bad based on shared values, and can be dialectically 
assessed. Every action can be framed and judged differently according to the 
intention it pursues (its end), and according to the circumstances that are taken 
into account (Bowlin 1999, 6:82). However, circumstances can shape inten-
tion, as they provide essential elements for deciding what kind of intention was 
the determinant one (Rhonheimer and Murphy 2008, 84)2. The analysis of the 
circumstances and the proximate end can provide critical questions that can be 
used in the assessment of the evaluation.
3. Evaluating means
The core of the operational syllogism is the framing of a state of affairs, namely 
how the agent chooses and wants to describe it. However, the conclusion, just 
like the minor premise, is an act of will (Westberg 2002, 163–164), which an 
agent consents to after assessing it and comparing it to the possibility and the 
2. For example, killing in self-defense can be determined by the intention of stopping an aggression, 
and not causing a person’s death. For this reason, it is praeter intentionem. Killing an innocent 
in order to save another’s life is still determined by the intention of the death of someone (and 
for this reason it is still murder).
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goodness of not performing it. Intending an end corresponds to the choice of its 
constitutive means, namely the means that are essential for the end (Westberg 
2002, 138–139; 144). For example, the decision to commit adultery or to have 
pleasure with a specifi c woman presupposes having a sexual affair with her. 
The decision to save one’s own life in the specifi c circumstance (in which the 
agent is clinging on a clifftop and a friend is hanging from a safety rope tied to 
the agent’s waist) presupposes (as the only means available) cutting the safety 
rope and killing a person (Westberg 2002, 145). In this sense, the evaluation of 
an action depends on the evaluation of the reason why it has been carried out 
(Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, q. 64, a. 7), namely the quality of the underlying 
intention or its proximate end (Pilsner 2006; Rhonheimer 1993), which includes 
the complexity of factors that specify the act of choice.
This type of reasoning corresponds to the classical topic from the end: that 
whose end is good is itself also good (Boethius, De Topicis Differentiis, 1189B 
33-34). For example, in the case mentioned above, an affair can be considered 
as intended to achieve pleasure, which is good. The end chosen is the proximate 
one (an action can result in a further positive consequence, but this does not 
constitute the object of the end), as remote ends are merely circumstances. The 
problem is how to assess the specifi c end that is pursued, and the necessary or 
constitutive means used to achieve it. To this purpose, we need to distinguish 
the principles used for describing the operational syllogisms (the individual 
values and intentions) from the ones that can be used to assess dialectically one 
(apparent) good over another, which is matter of the law or the moral system 
shared by a community.
The choice of a good depends on several circumstances, which can make an 
object appear as good when in fact it is not. Thomas Aquinas pointed out that the 
will can include one thing more than another, for the following reasons (West-
berg 2002, 93), which Aristotle expressed as hierarchies of values (Nicoma-
chean Ethics 1095a 18-27) and listed as topics (Aristotle, Topics 115b 19-27):
(1) one consideration may have more weight than another;
(2)  a person may ponder over one particular circumstance or aspect and 
not another, applying different perspectives; and
(3)  dispositions vary in people, and moods may also change in the same 
person. The will of an angry man will be moved differently from 
that of a calm man.
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For example, an affair with a woman can appear to be good (inasmuch as it 
leads to pleasure) but if we specify it further, we may need to change its clas-
sifi cation and, therefore, its evaluation. Thus, an affair with a married woman 
constitutes primarily an act of adultery, whose desirability needs to be taken 
into account for evaluating the whole act (while adultery is not the only means 
to achieve pleasure, it consists in breaching the fi delity of marriage) (Schmidtz 
1994; Rhonheimer 1993). The choice of taking all the circumstances of the state 
of affairs into consideration or only some of them corresponds to the agent’s 
will and results in his act of evaluation.
When the quality of an action, or the means to achieve an end, is doubtful or 
confl icts of values arise, the Aristotelian topics of the good and the preferable 
can guide the analysis of the doubt or the confl ict. They provide meta-arguments 
for deciding what value is better and shall be pursued. To this purpose, Aristotle 
provides in the Rhetoric and in the Topics a set of topics setting out operational 
defi nitions of what is good or desirable, such as good is “that which ought to 
be chosen for its own sake” or “that which is sought after by all things, or by 
all things that have sensation or reason” (Rhetoric I, 7). This type of defi nitions 
also applies to the classifi cation of what is better, i.e. what is desirable relatively 
to a certain situation (Topics 116a 28-34).
Aristotle provides other defi nitional criteria in the Topics and the Rhetoric. 
In particular, he provides defi nitions by listing the various species of what is 
good, i.e. by enumerating its essential parts (the virtues must be something 
good; pleasure must be a good thing; pleasant and beautiful things must be good 
things, etc.) (Rhetoric, 1362b 2-18). The various species of absolute good, i.e. 
what is to be chosen for its own sake, can be considered as specifi c reasons for 
acting, i.e. values. Some of them can mirror preferences while others can be 
set out as laws, which establish the ordering of values that shall be complied 
with. The point is that their ordering can be argued for and dialectically estab-
lished, based on various types of grounds. The fact that what is good is good 
for a reason provides at least a ground for discussing confl icts of values, and 
addressing them dialectically.
4. Practical reasoning
In the decision-making framework set out in the classical tradition, deliberation 
describes the operation of choice under uncertainty, namely when the means 
to achieve a goal is doubtful. When there are set operations to achieve specifi c 
ends (such as the ones constituting writing or driving), or when the means do not 
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affect at all or much the outcome, there is no need to deliberate. However, when 
the means to an end or the best means to it are uncertain, a type of reasoning 
combining the investigation of the means with their evaluation is at work. The 
reasoning from goals to an intended action can be thought of as a pattern of 
reasoning connecting an intention, or commitment to bringing about a state of 
affairs (von Wright 1972), with the means to achieve it. This reasoning provides 
a reason for acting, which the agent can assent to as the best means to pursue 
an end (Walton 2015, 122–124). This generic type of reasoning proceeds from 
a commitment to bring about a specifi c state of affairs, and specifi es means that 
are necessary for or productive of to the desired situation:
Argumentation scheme 3: Practical reasoning
PREMISE I (an agent) have a goal G.
EVALUATION Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G.
CONCLUSION Therefore A should (not) be brought about.
This scheme confl ates two patterns of reasoning. The fi rst pattern is the choice 
of the means: the agent chooses the best means to pursue a goal. The second 
pattern is an argument from values: the agent chooses to carry out an action 
based on his values (Walton 2015, 122–125).
Concerning the fi rst dimension of the scheme, a diction needs to be drawn 
between necessary (or constitutive) and productive means. In the fi rst case 
(Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 94-95), the agent needs to act in a specifi c 
fashion (according to the possible alternatives) if he wants the state of affairs 
to occur. Unless he acts according one of the possible alternatives, the desired 
state of affairs will not be brought about. At this point, he needs to choose 
about whether to carry out such a means or not, evaluating it. A different type 
of reasoning is the suffi cient scheme (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 96), 
in which the paradigm of the possible effi cient causes of the desired state of 
affairs remains open. The two patterns have different criteria of evaluation. In 
the necessary condition scheme, the agent needs to assess whether acting is 
more desirable than non-acting. In the suffi cient scheme, the agent needs to 
assess the action (means) in itself, and cannot justify it based solely on its end 
(which can be pursued in another way).
The evaluation of the various possible means to achieve a goal and the evalua-
tion of the performance of an action under uncertainty can be described as a type 
of assessment based on the relationship between an action and its possible foresee-
able consequences. While the analysis of the quality of an action is matter of the 
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operational syllogism (argument from values, taking into account the proximate 
and not the further intentions of an act), the assessment of the means to achieve 
an end can be conducted considering its foreseeable consequences (von Wright 
1963, 129–130), namely the wanted effect and the side-effects. More precisely, 
the intended effect needs to be compared with all the possible negative conse-
quences, which, even if unintended, determine the preferences among the means.
The criteria at work in the choice of the means are two: a) the unavoidable 
harm (or negative consequences) shall be compared and minimized; b) the 
avoidable harm shall be simply avoided (von Wright, 1963, pp. 131). According 
to these criteria, in the necessary scheme the agent needs to assess the possible 
good and harm resulting from performing and forbearing to perform an act, 
while in the suffi cient scheme he needs to consider only the intended and 
foreseeable consequences of the act. Finally, the choice between the possible 
means to bring about a desired state of affairs needs to be made considering 
the possible harm resulting from each option, and the good and negative conse-
quences resulting from the choice of the ones that minimize the harm.
This type of evaluation corresponds to a pattern of reasoning linking actions 
and goals that is different from the practical reasoning argument. It proceeds 
from an action to its effect, evaluating it as the necessary or productive cause of 
a desirable or undesirable state of affairs. We represent this type of reasoning 
as the argument from consequences (adapted from Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 
2008, p. 332):
Argumentation scheme 4: Argument from consequences
PREMISE If action Q is brought about, good (bad) consequences will plausiby 
occur.
EVALUATION That whose production is good is itself also good, and vice versa; that 
whose destruction is bad is itself also good, and vice versa (De Topicis 
Differentiis, 1190A 7-1190B 1).
CONCLUSION Therefore Q is good (bad).
Argument from consequences depends crucially on the circumstances that 
defi ne the means to achieve an end. The circumstances can be thought of as the 
specifying features of an action. By disregarding or omitting a circumstance, the 
agent can avoid taking into account some possible negative consequences that 
may follow the action. Just like in the case of evaluating an end, also choosing 
the means is matter of framing.
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5. Conclusion
The decision-making process can be described as a combination of reasoning 
and free choice, in which the agent rationally selects what is desirable for him 
and the best means to achieve it, but then needs to assent to such a goal and 
such an action to bring the goal about. Argumentation theory can contribute 
to the debate on actions and decisions by describing the mechanisms involved 
in the choice of both the goal and the means. By formalizing the steps of 
reasoning using argumentation schemes, it is possible to understand the 
crucial role played by the reasoning from classifi cation. An agent needs fi rst 
to determine whether a certain state of affairs is desirable or not, in order to 
commit himself to bring it about. He then needs to assess the possible means 
to achieve such a goal, and choose the best one (Macagno and Walton 2018).
Reasoning from classifi cation was shown to play a fundamental role. Both 
the aforementioned reasoning steps presuppose a classifi cation of a state of 
affairs or an action as desirable or more desirable. These classifi cations can 
be based on a systematic type of classifi cation, resulting in a complex analysis 
of the available information and a comparison between different principles 
of classifi cation. Otherwise, such evaluations can be made by relying on 
heuristic processes, proceeding from more accessible defi nitional criteria 
for establishing what is good. In this latter case, the agent can reach an easy 
and fast conclusion, which is, however, more defeasible and more subject to 
manipulations (Walton and Macagno 2009; Macagno and Walton 2008). By 
including or omitting circumstances, or by classifying an action improperly 
providing wrong reasons (Macagno and Walton 2014) it is possible to lead 
the interlocutor fallaciously to specifi c judgments or actions (Entman 1993; 
Lakoff 2010; Schiappa 2003).
An action can be classifi ed by considering the intention underlying it, its 
consequences, and the values that a society holds. Further intentions or further 
consequences can be also taken into account in the choice of means to an end, 
which can affect the quality of an action (mitigating or aggravating circum-
stances), but not its classifi cation. This distinction, grounded on principles of 
law, can be used as a possible criterion for analyzing the strategies and the 
manipulations of framing.
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